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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression,
policymakers and the general public are attempting to determine how such
a complete system-wide failure occurred. While there is neither a single
nor simple answer to this question, much blame has been directed at the
over-the-counter ("OTC") derivative market. Brooksley Borne, the former
chairwoman of the Commodity Future Trading Commission ("CFTC")
stated that "the toxic assets of many of our biggest banks are over-the-
counter derivatives and [they] caused the economic downturn that made us
lose our savings, lose our jobs, lose our homes," while Warren Buffet
called derivatives "financial weapons of mass destruction." 2 In response to
the widespread belief that derivatives were at the root of the recent financial
crisis, the Obama administration and Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"). Title
VII of this Act, titled "Wall Street Transparency and Accountability,"
places a number of new restrictions on the OTC derivatives market. This
paper will focus on the characteristics of the OTC market, effects of the
statute, and suggestions for improved regulation.
A. What is a Derivative?
A derivative is a financial contract that derives its value from market
conditions in the contract's "underlying," which can be, inter alia, asset
prices or index levels.3 The derivatives market, despite its size and
complexity, is composed primarily of only forwards, futures, options, and
* Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009),
http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/waming/etc/script.html.
2 Buffett Warns on Investment 'Time Bomb, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2817995.stm.
3 Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Cause of Informational Failure
and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1464-65
(1993).
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swaps.4 Forwards and futures are contracts that obligate a buyer to buy and
a seller to sell a certain amount of something to one another at a set
maturity date for a predetermined price.5  Though there are several
characteristics that distinguish forwards from futures, the primary
difference is that the former is traded in the OTC market while the latter is
traded on organized exchanges.6  Options are similar to forwards and
futures in most characteristics except that forwards and futures obligate
both parties to perform the terms of the contract while in an option, only the
seller is obligated to perform at the option of the buyer in exchange for a
fee charged to the buyer. In contrast to other types of derivatives, swaps
are agreements that obligate the counterparties to exchange payments over a
period of time that reflect changes in the market for the swap's underlying.8
Special note should be made of the credit default swap ("CDS"), which
is an instrument that was not only at the center of the recent financial crisis,
but also contains a number of features that distinguish it from traditional
swaps. In a typical CDS, the buyer will pay a fee to the seller who agrees
to pay the buyer a specified amount in the event that "credit events" take
place on an underlying debt instrument.9 A CDS is unlike other swaps
because it is not a periodic swap of cash flows, but, rather, one party paying
another for insurance against certain credit events that can include, inter
alia, the failure of the borrower of the underlying debt instrument to pay
back their debt in accordance with the loan agreement (i.e., the borrower
defaults).' °
4 Robert J. Aalberts & Percy S. Poon, Derivatives and the Modern Prudent Investor
Rule: Too Risky or Too Necessary?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 525, 546 (2006).
5 Id. at 546-49.
6 Id. at 547-48.
7 There are two types of options: call options and put options. Id. at 549-550. A
call option grants the buyer the right to purchase the underlying asset at a given
price (i.e., strike price) by a given date (i.e., expiration date), while a put option
rants the buyer the right to sell. Id.
A simple example of a swap is a fixed for floating interest rate swap. In this type
of swap, one counterparty will exchange a payment based on a fixed interest rate
on a specified amount of money (i.e., notional amount) in return for a payment
based on an interest rate that varies with a given market rate (e.g., LIBOR) on a
given notional amount. Id. at 550.
9 Bruce E. Kayle, The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Credit Derivative
Transactions, 851 PLIITAx 123, 129 (2008).
1 id.
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B. What is the Basic Structure of the Derivatives Market?
The whole of the global derivatives market can be separated into the
exchange traded market and OTC market." The primary difference
between the two markets is the way in which the contracts are traded. In
the exchange traded market, buyers and sellers typically place orders with
their brokers who then go to a formal, organized exchange (e.g., the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange) that acts as a "central marketplace where all
orders are collected and matched."' 12 Prior to Dodd-Frank, the only types of
derivatives traded on exchanges were futures and options.13 In contrast to
exchange traded derivatives, OTC derivatives were, prior to Dodd-Frank,
traded bilaterally rather than through an exchange. 14 A customer wishing
to enter an OTC derivative would go to his broker-dealer, who would either
enter into the contract directly with its customer or arrange a contract with
another broker-dealer.' 5 In past years, the vast majority of trades took place
in the OTC market.
1 6
C. How are Derivatives Used?
Derivatives are primarily used either for risk management or
speculation.' 7 As a risk management tool, derivatives allow a business to
hedge against future market risks.' 8 An example of hedging is the use by
financial institutions of fixed for floating interest rate swaps to guard
against interest rate risk.19 Interest rate risk is a problem for a number of
financial institutions because the rates they pay on their liabilities fluctuate
often while the rates banks earn on their assets are stable.20 This disparity
"1 Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 677, 731 (2002).
12 Deutsche Bbrse AG, The Global Derivatives Market: An Overview, DEUTSCHE
BORSE GROUP 17 (2008), http://www.eurexchange.com/download/documents/
publications/global derivatives market.pdf.
13 Bank for Int'l Settlements, Table 23A: Derivative financial instruments traded
on organised exchanges, BIS QUARTERLY REvIEw A126 (2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/rqal 006.pdf#page= 126.
14 Deutsche Borse AG, supra note 12, at 6, 17.
5 Id. at 17.
16 Id. at 4 ("Only around 16% of the notional amount outstanding is traded on
exchanges.").
17 See Feder, supra note 11, at 717.
18 In its simplest terms, a hedging strategy is where an entity enters a derivative
with a value that is inversely correlated to a position already on its books, so as the
value of one position decreases, the other increases, thereby offsetting any
losses. Id.
19 Daniel P. Cunningham, William P. Rodgers, Jr. & George W. Bilicic, Jr., Interest
Rate and Currency Swaps and Related Transactions, 778 PLI/CORP 9, 15 (1992).
20 id.
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in rates can lead to significant losses if market rates suddenly jump and was
one of the primary causes of the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s .2 An
interest rate swap allows banks to swap the fixed rate they receive on their
assets for variable rate interest payments with the result that the movement
in the rate of return on their assets keeps pace with the interest payments
they must make on their liabilities. Derivatives are extremely popular as
risk management tools, and a report approximates that ninety-four percent
of the 500 largest companies use some form of derivative for risk
management purposes.22
While hedging strategies are used to reduce an entity's risk exposure, if
an entity is taking a speculative position, it is taking on risk by betting on
future market conditions.23 Using derivatives to speculate was the root
cause of most of the headlining derivatives related losses, including the
bankruptcy of Orange County, the failure of Long Term Capital
Management ("LTCM"), the fatal losses at Barings Bank, and the near
collapse of American International Group ("AIG").24 Unfortunately,
evidence suggests that derivatives are more commonly used for speculative
rather than hedging purposes. "
D. What risks do derivatives pose?
1. Market Risk
Market risk is the risk that a firm will sustain losses as adverse price
movements in the derivative's underlying will cause it to lose value.26 The
level of market risk posed by a firm's derivative position is determined by a
number of variables and can be a significant risk to that firm. However, the
market risk posed to the economy as a whole by the derivatives market is
21 Luke Zubrod, Beware of the Mongoose, FIN. TIMES, June 17, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/99e016e6-7a1 e-I df-9871-00144feabdc0.html.
22 Press Release, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Over 94% of the
World's Largest Companies Use Derivatives to Help Manage Their Risks,
According to ISDA Survey (Apr. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.isda.org/press/press042309der.pdf.
23 In a speculative trade, the entity has no offsetting position, so it bears all the
gains and losses of any movements in the derivative's value.
24 Lynn A. Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, CATO
INSTITUTE 30, 32 (2009), http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv32n3/v32n3-
1.pdf.251Id. at33.
26 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, RISK MGMT. OF FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 18 (1997), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/deriv.pdf [hereinafter OCC].
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always, going to be zero.27  This is because, for every dollar lost on a
derivatives trade, the loser's counterparty will gain a dollar (i.e., it is a zero
sum game); therefore, there will never be a net loss as the result of market
risk. 8
The primary determinant of the price of a derivative is the market
conditions of the underlying, and, as a result, the extent of market risk of a
swap is largely determined by the risk inherent in the underlying's market.29
For example, if a firm is writing CDSs on junk bonds, the firm will be
exposed to a higher level of market risk than if the firm were offering CDSs
on bonds from entities with high credit ratings. While the market risk of
the underlying is an important determinant of risk levels, this risk can be
either mitigated or exacerbated by the final two components of market risk:
the price sensitivity of the derivative and the liquidity of the derivatives
market.3°
Price sensitivity is the extent to which the value of the derivative will
change in response to a change in the market for the underlying and is
determined by a number of factors, including, inter alia, the terms of the
contract, maturity, and amount of leverage. 3' Among all the factors
affecting price sensitivity, large amounts of leverage have been perceived
as raising market risks to unacceptable levels.32 Leverage, a characteristic
inherent in all derivatives, is a means by which investors reduce the initial
cost of their investments and increase their size by putting up only a small
amount of cash for large positions in the market.33
The second determinant of market risk is the liquidity of the instrument,
which is defined as the ability to buy or sell the asset quickly without
having a significant effect on its price.34 In an illiquid market, a firm may
have to sell at a deep discount in order to rid itself of the position quickly.
The liquidity of the derivatives market affects the market risk associated
27 Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial Bingo ": A Risk-Based
ApProach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (1997).
28 Id.
29 OCC, supra note 26, at 18.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 E.g., Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 253, 254 (2009) ("A highly leveraged financial system is like a
powder keg-it can turn a small spark, relatively harmless in most environments,
into a large and devastating explosion.").
33 OCC, supra note 26, at 21 ("By definition, derivative contracts are leveraged
because for a relatively small performance bond (e.g., margin) or premium, a
counterparty can enter into a transaction that possesses the risk/return tradeoff of a
much larger dollar volume of the underlying cash instrument.").
34 Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk. Innovative Finance or
the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REv 1023, 1043-44 (1994).
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with a derivative because, if the market is illiquid, this will either prolong
the time it takes to unwind a losing position, thereby exposing the firm to
increased losses, or it will increase the cost of quickly unwinding the
35position.
It is important to remember that the market risk associated with
individual contracts is not of particular importance because a firm will often
have offsetting positions that will counteract losses or gains in one
instrument; therefore, it is important to look at a firm's entire balance sheet
when calculating its market risk.36 Generally speaking, the market risk can
be reduced or eliminated by hedging the position, so that, as one instrument
loses value, the other will offset the losses, but there is another form of
market risk associated with some of these positions called correlation or
basis risk.37
For a hedge to work properly, the value of the position being hedged
must have an inverse relationship to that of the derivative, so, as the value
of the hedged position decreases, those losses are offset by the increase in
value of the derivative and vice versa. Basis risk "is the risk that
correlation between two prices may change," which, in turn, may increase a
firm's net market risk.3 8 Basis risk can result either from inefficiencies in
the derivatives market that cause the value of a derivatives and its
underlying to be imperfectly correlated or from a change in the historical
correlation between the hedged and hedging positions.39
2. Counterparty risk
Counterparty risk is the risk associated with the failure of a firm's
counterparty to perform its obligations under a derivatives agreement,
which would cause the firm to sustain a loss. 40 Because counterparty risk
can be quite significant, firms should carefully evaluate the
creditworthiness of their counterparties and reevaluate these assessments as
market conditions change. Counterparty risk is composed of both current
and potential credit exposures.4'
The current risk exposure on any given derivative is equal to the price
the non-defaulting counterparty would have to pay in the market to replace
the defaulted upon derivative with an identical derivative from another
35 Id.
36 Barry W. Taylor, Derivatives Product Activities of Commercial Banks, 815
PLI/CoRP 209,226-27 (1993).
37 See OCC, supra note 26, at 18-20.
38 OCC, supra note 26, at 20.
39 Idd Krawiec, supra note 27, at 20.
40 Taylor, supra note 36, at 222.
41 Derivatives Risk in Commercial Banking, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Mar. 26,
2003), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytica/fyi/2003/032603fyi.html.
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42
counteparty. For example, assume a swap is entered into with a value of
zero, meaning that the market views the cash flows being swapped are
equal. Though the initial value of the swap is zero, as market conditions
move against one counterparty and for the benefit of the other, the fair
market value of the swap will be positive for the counterparty that
benefitted and negative for the other.43 The positive fair value reflects the
fact that the terms of the swap are more favorable than the prevailing
market conditions and represents the premium that would have to be paid in
order to enter into a new swap with identical terms.44 While the holder of
the positively valued derivative has a current credit exposure equal to the
replacement cost, the holder of the negatively valued derivative has no
exposure because it is a losing contract and, therefore, would not be harmed
if its counterparty defaulted.45 The negative fair value essentially reflects
how much less the party is making under the swap agreement than the party
could make if they were to use current market rates.46
Firms also face potential exposure because the positive and negative
fair values are not static.47 Although it can be difficult and possibly
inaccurate, by taking certain variables into consideration, a reasonable
estimate of potential future credit exposure can be made.48 Variables that
are taken into account include the swap maturity length (the potential for
exposure increases with the length of maturity) and the volatility of the
underlying.49
Evaluating the credit risk of individual derivatives does not fully
indicate the credit exposure of a given counterparty because of the
existence of bilateral netting agreements. When entering into an OTC
derivative, parties will typically use a standard form called the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA") Master Agreement that has a
bilateral netting provision that allows the parties to document all the
derivatives transactions in which they both participate and aggregate their
obligations.5 ° Because of bilateral netting, the real credit exposure posed by
42 Id.
43 Barry W. Taylor, Running with the Pack: The Collective Behavior of Swap
Dealers, 603 PLI/CoRP 45, 66 (1988).441id.
41 See id.
46 See id.
47 Taylor, supra note 36, at 224.
48 Id.
49 See id.
50 Credit Default Swaps and Counterparty Risk, EUR. CEN. BANK, 42-43 (2009),
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/creditdefaultswapsandcounterpartyrisk2009en.pdf
276 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 6:1
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
a given counterparty is the net of the positive and negative fair value of all
the derivatives in which a firm has entered with that counterparty.5"
3. Operational Risk
Operational risk is "the risk that deficiencies in information systems or
internal controls, human error, or risk management failure result in
unexpected losses. ' 2 Operational risk has two different components. The
first component is the risk of loss that can arise from day-to-day errors that
pose limited risk to the institution, such as data entry errors or similar
clerical mistakes.53 The second component is the risk that arises from
events that are uncommon but that can result in large losses due to factors
such as natural disasters or fraud.54
One source of operational risk that is particularly worrisome for those
holding derivatives is fraud. The significance of this risk is emphasized by
an Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") report which found
that many of the largest derivatives related losses at banks were the result of
failures of risk managers to identify and stop the fraudulent activity of
employees. 55 Derivatives are particularly pernicious in creating this type of
risk because of their complexity.5 6 While some derivatives are relatively
simple to understand many are so complex that "[t]he complexity can
overwhelm even experts. 57 Complexity is primarily a problem in the OTC
market where the parties are free to draft the contracts to be extremely
complex, as opposed to the exchange market where contracts are
standardized. 58 Unfortunately, although the individualized contracts in the
OTC market are beneficial in that they allow parties to draft agreements
5' For example, if a firm's derivatives with a given counterparty have a positive fair
value of $100 but the firm also has derivatives with this same counterparty with a
negative fair value of ninety-nine dollars, then the net current credit exposure is
only one dollar. The firm will have to pay $100 to enter replacement contracts that
would be offset by ninety-nine dollars, which the firm will not have to pay on its
obligation on the losing swaps. See id
52 Deutsche Bbrse AG, supra note 12, at 38.
53 Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REv. 127, 134-35
(2009).54 Id. at 135.55 Derivatives Risk in Commercial Banking, supra note 41.
56 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risk, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 215, 350 (2002).
57 Hu, supra note 3, at 1480.58 Deutsche Borse AG, supra note 12, at 10.
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that fittheir needs perfectly, as the terms of the swap become more esoteric,
parties may be able to fraudulently conceal the true risk of the transaction.59
4. Systemic Risk
Systemic risk is the risk that financial problems in one institution or
market will spread to other institutions and markets with the result that the
losses from a seemingly isolated market event might threaten the entire
economy.60 The near collapse and subsequent government organized
bailout of LTCM is a prime example of the way in which derivatives cause
systemic risk. LTCM was a prominent player in the derivatives market with
approximately $500 billion in outstanding exchange-traded derivatives and
"at least" $750 billion in the OTC market and was one of the most active
participants in interest rate swaps.6 1 As a result of these positions, LTCM
was "counterparty to over 20,000 transactions and conducted business with
over 75 counterparties. '62  In the derivatives market, systemic risk is
brought about in two different ways, both of which were present during the
collapse of LTCM. First, because many of LTCM's derivatives were not
cleared, its counterparties were directly exposed to the risk that it would
collapse-i.e., counterparty risk.63  Analysts estimate that LTCM's
counterparties lost between $3 billion to $5 billion.64 Regulators were not
particularly concerned about the losses because the counterparties were
sufficiently capitalized to absorb the losses.65 Though counterparty losses
were not a significant concern during the LTCM collapse, when AIG was
on the brink of collapse, there were concerns that if AIG were to default on
its CDSs, its counterparties would go bankrupt and, as a result, the entire
financial system could collapse.66
Second, the collapse of LTCM would have posed systemic risk because
if LTCM defaulted on its derivatives positions, its counterparties would be
forced to rebalance their risk exposure.67 As the derivatives became
worthless, these firms would have been exposed to whatever risk the
derivatives had been hedging. In order to eliminate the risk exposure, the
counterparties could either contract for similar derivatives with other
counterparties or liquidate the positions that LTCM derivatives had been
59 See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1274
(S.D. Ohio 1996).
60 Feder, supra note 11, at 729.
61 U.S. Gov'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT:
REGULATORS NEED TO Focus GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK 7 (1999),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00003.pdf [hereinafter GAO].
62 id.
63 Deutsche B6rse AG, supra note 12, at 17.
64 GAO, supra note 61, at 12.
65 id.
66 See Stout, supra note 24, at 30.
67 GAO, supra note 61, at 13.
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hedging.68 Given the size of LTCM's positions, the rush to purchase other
derivatives and/or liquidate assets would have resulted in extremely volatile
prices that could have caused significant losses and put extreme pressure on
markets that were already strained by the Russian financial crisis.69 As a
result, the New York Federal Reserve Bank organized a private sector
bailout of LTCM in which a number of large banks that dealt with LTCM
agreed to contribute about $4 billion, which allowed LTCM to liquidate in
an orderly fashion without major impact on the markets.70
II. PAST REGULATION OF OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES
The regulatory structure surrounding derivatives is extremely complex
and involves the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the CFTC,
and a plethora of self-regulatory bodies. Although exchange traded
derivatives have been subject to extensive regulation for some time, OTC
derivatives have largely operated in an unregulated market. The lack of
regulation prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank was the result of the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act ("CFMA"), which became law in
2000. The CFMA was largely enacted in response to an attempt by the
CFTC to regulate OTC derivatives.7'
In the late 1990s, Brooksley Born, a lawyer appointed by President Bill
Clinton to head the CFTC, spearheaded an attempt to regulate the OTC
72derivatives market, particularly swaps and hybrid instruments. On May 7,
1998, the CFTC took the first step towards regulating the OTC derivatives
market by issuing a concept release.73 The release indicated that the CFTC
was considering a number of possible regulatory changes in response to the
dramatic increase in the size of the OTC derivative market, the increased
68 Id.
69 Risk of Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and
Financial Servs., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of William J. McDonough,
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), available at
http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/1998/mcd981001.html.
70 On an interesting side note, of all the banks asked to participate, the only bank
that refused to contribute any money was Bear Stems, and a decade later during the
financial crisis Bear was in the same position as LTCM, begging for a private
sector bailout. WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND
WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET 247-51 (Double Day 2009).
71 Reade Everett, Deriving a Solution for Derivative Reform: Proposals to
Reconstruct Over-the-Counter Derivative Markets, 28 REv. BANKING & FIN. L.
479,483 (2009).
72 Id.
73 CFTC Concept Release, Over-the-Counter-Derivatives (May 7, 1998), available
at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm. A concept release is a document
that invites the public to make comments regarding a proposed rule before the new
rule is formally proposed. Id.
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frequency of large losses among market participants, and the increased
diversity, of market participants, including less sophisticated individuals.74
The concept release indicated that the CFTC was considering regulations
that would force OTC derivatives transactions to be cleared, require dealers
and intermediaries to register with and report to the CFTC, set capital
requirements, require derivative dealers to maintain adequate risk
managemnent and internal controls, and set restriction on the sales practices
used by dealers.75
The concept release elicited a strong response from the Federal Reserve
Board, the U.S. Treasury, and the SEC. Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, and Robert Rubin, then Treasury Secretary,
immediately expressed their opposition to the regulation, believing that it
would unduly restrict the market for these "extraordinarily useful" risk
management tools, and that the private parties were better equipped to
regulate the market than the government.76 According to a senior director
at the CFTC, Greenspan told Born "that she essentially didn't know what
she was doing and she'd cause a financial crisis" by attempting to regulate
this market. 77 Greenspan and Rubin also convinced the chairman of the
SEC at the time, Arthur Levitt, to oppose the regulation. Levitt later
remembered that "[Greenspan and Rubin] were certainly very fiercely
opposed to [regulating the OTC derivatives market] and persuaded me that
this would cause chaos. 78
In late 1998, Congress reacted to the lobbying efforts of Greenspan,
Rubin and Levitt by instituting a freeze on any regulation by the CFTC in
the area of OTC derivatives. 79 The freeze was for a period of six months
while the President's Working Group on Financial Markets80 examined
whether regulation of the market was necessary.8' Soon after the temporary
freeze was implemented, Born resigned.82 In November 1999, the Working
Group issued a report on the OTC market and the Commodity Exchange
Act that strongly advocated that the CFTC should not have regulatory
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Peter S. Goodman, The Reckoning-Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan
Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at Al.
77 Id.
78 id.
79 David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, Who's in Charge? Agency Infighting and
Regulatory Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at C14.80 The Working Group on Financial Markets is a group of the Executive Branch's
most prominent financial market regulators including the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Secretary of the Department of the
Treasury, and the Chairmen of the SEC and CFTC.8' Barboza & Gerth, supra note 79.
82 Goodman, supra note 76.
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jurisdiction over the OTC derivatives market.83 The report concluded that
"the trading of financial derivatives by eligible swap participants 84 should
be excluded from the [Commodity Exchange Act]" and, therefore,
exempted from CFTC's regulatory jurisdiction.85  The Working Group
stated that if the CFTC were able to regulate OTC derivatives it "would
perpetuate legal uncertainty or impose unnecessary regulatory burdens and
constraints upon the development of these markets in the United States. 86
Congress responded to the Working Group's report by enacting the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 ("CFMA").87 The CFMA
"explicitly exempted OTC derivatives from regulation by the CFTC and
limited their regulation by the SEC. 88 Although federal regulation of OTC
derivatives was limited prior to Dodd-Frank, they were and still are subject
to private legal rules that are established by the contracts the parties enter
into. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. ("ISDA")
provides a standard form agreement called the "ISDA Master Agreement"
89that most market participants use for their OTC derivatives transactions.
This contract is entered into before completing the derivative transaction
and sets out the parties' obligations and establishes the events that will
constitute a default and termination of the agreement.90 After the parties
have signed a Master Agreement, they will enter into a verbal agreement
that establishes the terms of the transaction. 91  Following this verbal
agreement, they will sign a written confirmation that sets out the terms in
writing.92 The Master Agreement and the written confirmation together are
83 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 1 (1999), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/otcact.pdf.
84 Id. at 1 n.4 ('[Eligible swap participants' are defined to include various
regulated financial institutions, business enterprises that meet certain tests relating
to total assets or net worth, certain pension funds, state and local governments, and
certain wealth individuals").
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 THE DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 46-48 (2008), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/200803-Treasury-Report.pdf.
88 Frank D'Souza, Nan Ellis & Lisa Fairchild, Illuminating the Need for Regulation
in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 473, 493 (2010).89 Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of
Derivatives Regulation?, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
213, 217 (2002).
90 Id.
91 Id
92Id. at 217-18.
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the basis for the private rules that typically governs OTC derivatives
transactions.93
II. REGULATION OF THE OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVE MARKET
UNDER DODD-FRANK
Dodd-Frank imposes a broad array of new restrictions and regulations
that will reshape the derivatives market. Congress has delegated this
important task to the SEC and the CFTC, and both agencies will have a
large amount of discretion in implementing and shaping this statute.94 The
purpose of this section is not to parse every line of Dodd-Frank, but rather
focus on the most controversial and consequential provisions. To this end,
the regulations regarding derivatives trading at banks, capital and margin,
clearing, and exchange trading will be examined.
A. Derivative Trading at Banks
1. Summary of the Derivative Trading Activities at Banks
The U.S. banking industry is by far the dominant player in the global
OTC derivatives market with U.S. commercial banks holding
approximately $223 trillion of the $582 trillion outstanding notional amount
as of the second quarter of 2010. 95 The U.S. banking industry, in turn, is
93 id.
94 The agencies will have authority over different types of OTC derivatives, with
the CFTC having authority over an instrument if it is defined as "swap," while the
SEC will have authority if the instrument is defined as a "security based swap." If
the instrument has qualities of both a "swap" and a "security based swap," it will be
defined as a "mixed swap," and the CFTC and SEC will share regulatory
jurisdiction. The definition of "swap" under the Dodd-Frank Act includes most
types of options, forwards, and instruments traditionally referred to as swaps being
traded in the OTC market with some limited exceptions, while a "security based
swap" is simply any instrument defined as a "swap" that is based on a single
security, "narrow-based" (generally means less than ten component securities)
securities index, or occurrence of some event relating to the issuer of a security or
issuers of a "narrow based" securities index (i.e., CDSs). Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 712, 721, 761, 124
Stat. 1641, 1658, 1754 (2010).
9 5 OCC, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES:
SECOND QUARTER 2010 1, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-
markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq2 10.pdf; Amounts outstanding of
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives by risk category and instrument: Publication
up to 2010 Q2 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS 1, http://www.bis.org/statistics/
derstats.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
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dominated by only a few banks, with ninety-six percent of the total national
amount being held by only five of the largest dealer-banks.96
In the derivatives market, banks act as hedgers, dealers and
speculators. 97 Approximately seventy-seven percent of the U.S. banks that
hold derivatives utilize them "solely for hedging purposes," 98 but the vast
majority of the notional value of derivatives at U.S. banks is held by banks
not as hedgers-i.e., "end users"--but as dealers. 99 Dealing is more risky
than hedging and can also contain an element of speculation masked as
dealing.l00
When banks are acting as derivative-dealers for customers, they do so
in one of three ways. First, the bank can engage in matched trading, where
"a dealer enters into a trade with a customer and then enters into an equal,
offsetting position with another counterparty."'' In matched trading, the
dealer's profit is the spread, which is the difference between the price at
which the dealer sells the derivatives position to one party and what the
dealer pays for an equal but opposite position from another party.10
The second type of derivatives dealing is market-making. This is
similar to matched trading except the bank does not have an offsetting trade
immediately available, but by the end of the trading day, the bank has found
other avenues to offset most of its risk exposures.10 3 This does, however,
expose the banks to the risk of adverse market changes during the day. To
offset this risk, the bank will charge a higher fee- similar to an insurance
company raising its premium on riskier policies-to compensate the bank
for the increased risk.' 4
The final type of dealer activity is called positioning. In positioning, the
bank fills an order for a customer, but does not purchase an offsetting
position.10 5  Though there are a number of legitimate reasons for
positioning, this practice can also operate as an insidious way for the bank
to engage in speculation.10 6 If, for example, the bank believes that the
market will turn against a customer's position, it may not want to offset the
96 OCC, supra note 95, at 1.
97 FDIC, supra note 41.98 id.
99 See OCC, supra note 95, at graph 1.
100 Derivatives Risk in Commercial Banking, supra note 41.
101 Id.
102 For example, if the bank sells a CDS insuring a $1 million bond for $50,000 to
party X and then purchases a CDS insuring that same $1 million bond from party Y
for $49,000, the bank has made $1000.
103 Derivatives Risk in Commercial Banking, supra note 41.
'04 See id1o5 Id.
106 id.
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trade so that it can reap the profits from the market movements it expects;
however, the bank will also be exposed to all the downside risk as well.
When banks engage in speculation by not offsetting customer trades it is
called "embedded proprietary trading" and can be difficult to distinguish
from legitimate dealer activities.1
0 7
Speculative trading is by far the most risky derivatives activity a bank
may engage in due to the bank's exposure to a large amount of market
risk.10 8 Though speculative trading is closely associated with proprietary
trading, which is when the bank trades on its own account rather than that
of a client, speculative trading can take place even in a "customer driven"
transaction when the bank engages in "embedded proprietary trading,"
which was mentioned above. 109 The extent to which banks are actually
engaging in speculative trading is difficult to determine and is seldom
reported.
2. Regulation Under the Dodd-Frank Act
Banks' trading derivatives are regulated in two ways under Dodd-
Frank: the "Volcker Rule" and the "push-out provision." The "Volcker
rule"--proposed by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal
Reserve-would prevent a "banking entity" from engaging in proprietary
trading in, inter alia, any type of derivative. 10 The definition of proprietary
trading under the statute would prohibit the bank from "engaging as a
principal for the trading account of the banking entity ... in any transaction
to purchase or sell or otherwise dispose of [any type of derivative]."' '
However, because there can be a number of legitimate-i.e., non-
speculative-ends met by certain types of proprietary trading, legislators
inserted a number of exceptions from this ban. The exemptions would
continue to allow banks to engage in "proprietary trading" so long as it is
"in connection with... market making related activities, to the extent that
any such activity ... are designed not to exceed the reasonably expected
107 Dropping Swaps Plan for Volcker Rule May Not Reduce Bank Risk,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 11, 2010, 1:00 PM),
http://news.businessweek.com/article.asp?documentKey 1 377-aVvPZYInzAxO-
600TTIOBCNQE4G82RR8A2OA37A [hereinafter Dropping Swaps Plan].
108 Derivatives Risk in Commercial Banking, supra note 41.
109 Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the
"Business of Banking", 63 U. MIAMi L. REV. 1041, 1097 (2009).
" 10 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 619, .124 Stat. 1620 (2010); Dropping Swaps Plan, supra note 107.
"'1 Alison Vekshin & Phil Mattingly, Lawmakers Reach Compromise on Financial
Regulation, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2010, 12:01 AM)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-25/lawmakers-reach-compromise-on-
financial-regulation.html.
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near-term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties."' 12 Banks will
also be able to engage in "proprietary trading" if it is for hedging purposes
or on behalf of a customer.' 13 The statute is defined in such a way as to
prohibit only proprietary trading of a speculative nature.
There are, however, a number of academics and politicians that believe
the Volcker Rule is insufficient to mitigate the risks derivatives pose to the
banking industry.' 14 They propose that commercial banks should be forced
to create separate companies to perform derivatives trading.115 In response,
former Senator Blanche Lincoln, Democrat of Arkansas, introduced what
became known as the "push-out provision," which forces banks to spin off
their derivative trading desks into separately capitalized affiliates."
16
The "push-out provision," which is contained in the section titled
"Prohibition Against Federal Government Bailouts of Swaps Entities,"
states that "no Federal assistance may be provided to any swap entity with
respect to any swap, security-based swap, or other activity of the swaps
entity."'" 7 Dealer banks that will likely be considered "swap dealers" under
the statute will, as a result of their classification as "swap dealers," fall
under the definition of "swaps entity. ' 18  The definition of "federal
assistance" includes FDIC insurance and access to the different lending
facilities provided by the Federal Reserve, including the discount window
and many, but not all, of the other credit facilities it offers." 19 Because
access to FDIC insurance is required by law for many banks and is
"virtually a necessity" for the few banks not required to possess it, this
provision effectively prohibits covered banks from engaging in "proprietary
trading" as defined by Dodd-Frank. 20
12 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §619.
113 Id.
"14 See, e.g., Jane D'Arista & Geral Epstein, Banks Must Be Barred from Dealing
Derivatives: It's Not a Normal Part of the Business of Banking, HUFFINGTON POST,
May 10, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/safer/banks-must-be-barred-
from b 569824.html.
" 
6Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §716.
"7 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §716.
118 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 716, 721.
119 The definition of "federal assistance" still allows the Federal Reserve to provide
emergency lending to swaps entities under the Federal Reserve Act because it only
prohibits assistance from the Fed "that is not part of a program or facility with
broad-based eligibility under 13(3)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act." Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 716.
120 Michael P. Malloy, Can lOb-S for the Banks? The Effect of an Antifraud Rule
on the Regulation of Banks, 61 FoRDHAm L. REv. S23, S41 n. 111 (1993).
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The initial language of the bill was widely criticized because it would
prevent banks from hedging' 21 and acting as dealers1 22 with the result that
banks:would be restricted in their ability to manage risk, distorting the
market for derivatives, and even possibly driving many derivatives trades
into the "dark comer" of the market.1 23 In response to these criticisms, the
final version of Dodd-Frank unambiguously allow banks to use derivatives
for hedging and will allow banks to deal in certain types of derivatives,
including those whose underlying "rates or reference assets that are
permissible for investment by a national bank" and CDS's on corporate
bonds, but only if the institution has high credit ratings and the CDS is
cleared.1 24  The effect of this watered down version is expected to be
minimal as "$500 trillion of the $615 trillion OTC derivative market will
now be exempt from the prohibition, but it will force out the derivative that
has been largely perceived as one of the riskiest: CDS's on low quality debt
instruments.' 2 5 The new language also resolves some prior ambiguity by
allowing a bank to keep the riskier derivatives activities at subsidiaries
within the holding company so long as the subsidiary's capital is separate
from the bank.1
2 6
3. Criticism of Dodd-Frank
The primary goal of Dodd-Frank should be to reduce the market risk
that banks are able to take. The reason that market risk, rather than other
121 Letter from Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, to Senator
Christopher Dodd, Chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs (May 12, 2010) ("Prohibiting depository institutions from engaging in
significant swaps activities will weaken the risk mitigation efforts of banks" and
that "[florcing these activities out of insured depository institutions would
weaken... financial stability.").
122 Id. ("[Banks play] an essential role [in] providing market-making functions for
these products.").
123 Ben Bemanke argued that if the provision forces all swaps activities out of
banks, the demand will be met by institutions that are not as well regulated and
capitalized as banks and industry analysts estimated that $294 trillion worth of
derivatives would be driven "beyond the reach of regulators" as the result of an
overbroad "push out" provision. Id.; Brady Dennis, Derivatives-SpinoffProposal
Opposed as Part of Overhaul Bill, WASH. POST, May 4, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/03/
AR2010050304094.html.
124 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 716(d).
1251d. § 716 (d)(2), (d)(3); Robin Maxwell & Rebecca Wasserman, Derivatives
Reform: Bank Push-Outs Under Dodd-Frank, WESTLAW BuS. (Aug. 5, 2010),
http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Articles/2010/08/20100805_0012.aspx?src=R
SS.
126 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 716(c).
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types of risk, should be its primary goal is that the other risks need to be
reduced across the entire industry and are, therefore, better addressed by
industry wide legislation. Allowing certain institutions to take on
significant market risk via speculative trades is important to the. health of
the derivatives market because speculators are a key source of liquidity;
however, preventing banks from taking on excessive market risk is
important to protect taxpayer funds that are at risk via Federal Reserve
lending and FDIC insurance that, in effect, would subsidize banks in their
quest for the higher returns that accompany high market risk trades. 2 7 The
way in which both the "Volcker Rule" and the "push-out provision" are
tailored to primarily restrict only speculation while allowing dealing and
hedging is prudent because the market risk of dealing and hedging is largely
negated through offsetting positions. 
128
While the Dodd-Frank is successful in many ways, there are a number
of areas in which the Act needs to be amended. First, it is important that
Dodd-Frank deals with the possibility of "embedded proprietary trading."
It appears that Dodd-Frank allows this type of trading activity so long as it
was customer originated-thereby complying with the "Volcker Rule"-
and in one of the derivatives allowed under the "push-out provision." This
omission may not be much of a concern, given that bank regulators have
broad authority to compel banks to keep risk to a minimum; however, as the
agencies issue rules to carry out Dodd-Frank, they should be aware of this
insidious form of speculative trading and deal with it accordingly. The
second concern is with the "push-out provision." The concern is that it is
simply unnecessary."' By pushing out certain derivatives, legislators
believe that they are reducing the market risks posed by the positions, but if
there are offsetting positions, the market risks posed by these transactions
can be negated.
30
B. Capital and Margin Requirements
1. The mechanics of capital and margin requirements
The provisions of Dodd-Frank that require an entity to post minimum
levels of capital and margin for most derivatives transactions are some of
the most beneficial provisions of the new Act. By requiring minimum
levels of capital and margin, the provision will limit the counterparty risk
an entity poses to its counterparties by ensuring the entity has sufficient
127 Krawiec, supra note 27, at 15.
128 See supra Pt.III.A. 1.
129 See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, In Tough Stance on Wall St., Democrat Finds Few
Allies, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2010, at A16.
130 See Derivatives Risk in Commercial Banking, supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
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funds to meet its obligations. For an entity to meet its capital requirements
it will have to set aside a certain amount of capital for each derivative it
enters. 31 Margin requirements are comparable to capital requirements in
most ways. The amount of margin that must be posted for a given
derivative transaction is comparable to the amount of capital that would be
required, 32 and it imposes the same costs by tying up funds that could
otherwise be used for investment. Margin requirements differ from capital
requirements slightly in the way in which they function. First, unlike
capital requirements, the funds posted to meet the margin requirements
typically do not stay on the entity's books but rather are deposited directly
with the counterparty. 133 Second, margin requirements mandate that both
initial and variation margin be posted. 34 Initial margin is very similar to
capital requirements in that it requires a certain amount of funds-generally
a percentage of the notional value of the swap--be posted in order to
provide some buffer against losses in case the depositing counterparty were
to default.135 Variation margin differs slightly because it requires that the
counterparties mark-to-market the value of the swap on a daily basis and
that the losing counterparty exchange an amount equal to the difference
between the previous day's close and the current day's close. 36  The
purpose of variation margin is to limit counterparty risk by ensuring that
credit exposure remains constant through the life of the derivative. 137
131 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 731, 764.
132 "COMPARABILITY-The entities described in clause (i) shall, to the
maximum extent practicable, establish and maintain comparable minimum capital
requirements and minimum initial and variation margin requirements, including the
use of non-cash collateral, for-(I) swap dealers; and (II) major swap participants."
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 731 (e).
13" Id. §§ 724, 763.
134 Id. §§ 731, 764.
135 See Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case
Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 639, 647-48 (2010).1361id.
13 7An example of how variation margin keeps credit risk constant follows is if the
market value of a credit default swap on $1 million in bonds transaction increases
to 300 basis points (market value of swap is $30,000) from the previous day's price
of 250 basis points (market value of $25,000) to reflect the increase likelihood that
the corporate bonds will go into default, then the variation margin to be paid from
the issuer to the purchaser is fifty basis points ($5000). The payment allows the
purchaser's initial credit risk exposure ($25,000) to remain constant because even
though purchaser would now have to pay $30,000 in the market for a new credit
default swap if the issuer defaulted, the original purchaser has received $5000
which offset the increased risk. Id.
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2. Regulation Under Dodd-Frank
Dodd-Frank imposes capital and margin requirements on derivative
trades by either requiring that the trade be cleared by a specified clearing
organization, which will impose their own margin requirements -on the
counterparty,138 or by requiring that certain entities post capital and margin
for their uncleared trades' 39  Though Dodd-Frank breaks margin and
capital requirements into two different categories-those for "swaps" and
those for "security-based swaps"-the effect of the statute is similar
regardless of the classification. 40  The classification simply determines
regulatory jurisdiction with the CFTC primarily regulating the former and
the SEC the latter.' 41 Further, the regulators responsible for setting the
requirements are required to have comparable requirements so a firm's
level of capital and margin will not vary widely between regulators.
42
Because the language of the two sections is nearly identical, this paper will
only address the language relating to "swaps" and address "security-based
swaps" only if there is a notable divergence.
Dodd-Frank mandates that the capital levels must be set at levels that
will "help ensure the safety and soundness" of the entity and that are
"appropriate for the risk associated" with the derivative. 43  Capital and
margin requirements for uncleared swaps will also be higher than for
cleared trades to "offset the greater risk to the swap dealer or major swap
participant and the financial system arising from the use of swaps that are
not cleared. . . ."'44 Further, when setting capital requirements, regulators
will take into account the risks posed by other activities at the institution.'
45
Dodd-Frank requires regulators to impose capital and margin
requirements upon all uncleared derivatives of any firm that is classified as
either a "major swap participant" or a "swap dealer."' 146 The definition of a
"major swap participant" is "any person who is not a swap dealer," and has
a "substantial position" in derivatives taking into account certain
138 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 725(c).
139 See id. §§ 731, 764.
140 Though the statute only refers to "swaps" and "security-based swaps," these
definitions encompass most OTC derivative products, including forwards and
options, and are not limited to those products traditionally referred to as swaps. See
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 83.
141 It is important to note that if there is a bank involved, it will be that entity's
prudential regulator that will be the primary determinant of the bank's capital and
margin requirements. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act §§ 731, 764.
14 2 Id. § 731(e).
143 Id.
144 id
14" Id. §§ 731(d), 764(e).
'46Id. § 731(e).
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exemptions, has significant counterparty risk, or is highly leveraged and has
a substantial position with no allowance for any exemptions. 47 Because
the definition of "substantial position" is to be defined by the relevant
Commission, the exact scope of this provision will largely fall to the
regulators.
48
A' 'swap dealer" is any person who "holds itself out as a dealer in
swaps; makes a market in swaps; regularly enters into swaps with
counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own account; or
engages in any activity causing the person to be commonly known in the
trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps. ' 49  This definition will
certainly include the largest dealer banks, but also some of the other smaller
banks which deal in derivatives. There is, however, an exemption for banks
that only provide derivatives to customers when in conjunction with a
traditional loan.'
50
During the drafting of the bill, there was widespread criticism of these
definitions because it was feared that end-users would be subject to clearing
and margin requirements. The International Swaps and Derivatives
Association has conducted research and believes that if end-users are
subjected to these requirements and if the requirements are imposed on
existing contracts, it could cost "as much as $1 trillion in capital and
liquidity requirements."'' The primary fear was that end-users would fall
within the definition of "major swap participant" or that their swaps will
have to be cleared and, ergo, be subject to the derivative clearing
organization's ("DCO") requirements. Legislators have responded to this
concern both by specifically exempting end-users from the clearing
requirement 152 and, although there is no specific exemption for end-users
from the definition of "major swap participant," there is legislative history
that will remove end-users from this requirement.
One piece of this legislative history is a letter from two of the primary
authors of the Senate bill, former Senator Dodd and former Senator
Lincoln, to their House of Representative counterparts stating that "margin
and capital requirements are not to be imposed on end-users" and that the
requirements should "not punish those who are trying to hedge their own
147 Id. § 721(33).
148 Id.
149 Id. § 721(49).
150 id.
151 Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Assoc., U.S. Companies May Face US
$1 Trillion in Additional Capital and Liquidity Requirements As a Result of
Financial Regulatory Reform, According to ISDA Research (June 29, 2010),
available at http://www.isda.org/media/press/2010/press062910.html.
152 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 723, 763.
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commercial risk."' 153  The primary authors of the bill in the House of
Representatives have also expressed similar opinions. During colloquy on
the House floor between Representative Colin Peterson and Barney Frank,
Representative Peterson stated that any characterization of the bill as
subjecting end-users to capital and margin requirements was "patently
false" and that "nowhere in this section do we give regulators any authority
to impose capital and margin requirements on end-users."
' 15 4
Representative Frank agreed with Representative Peterson's statement. 155
Because there is sufficient legislative history to indicate Congress did not
intend to regulate end-users in this way, if a regulatory agency were to
attempt to impose these requirements on an end-user, the end-user would
likely be able to successfully challenge it in court.
156
Congress has also responded to the concern that the end-users' dealers
would simply pass on the costs of these new requirements to their end-user
customers, thereby indirectly subjecting end-users to the burdens of this
requirement by drafting the legislation so that the margin and capital
requirements on transactions between dealer and end-user are "consistent
with the congressional intent to protect end-users from burdensome
costs.' ' 157 Although this compromise may not completely eliminate the
issue, it will help manage the cost of derivatives for hedgers by leading
regulators to impose less onerous requirements on transactions in which a
counterparty is an end-user.
3. Criticism of Dodd-Frank
While the efficacy of the section will largely depend on the capital or
margin requirements set by the regulators, there is one major problem with
the statute itself that needs to be remedied. The problem is that Dodd-Frank
will not subject existing derivatives to any form of capital or margin
requirements because they are explicitly exempted from the clearing
requirements, 58 and though not stated in the statute explicitly, legislators
have stated that they did not intend capital and margin requirements to
153 Letter from Senator Blanche Lincoln & Senator Christopher Dodd to
Congressman Barney Frank & Congressman Colin Peterson (June 30, 2010),
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/dodd-lincoln-
letter0701O10.pdf.
154 156 CONG. REC. H5245 (June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Peterson).
"' Id. at H5248.
156 End-users would likely be able to successfully challenge the regulation because
Congressional intent is clear and the agencies tasked with enforcing the legislation
"must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of congress" when doing
so. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
157 Letter from Lincoln and Dodd, supra note 153.
158 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 723(a), 763(f)
124 Stat. 1675 (2010).
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apply existing contracts. Senator Chris Dodd and Senator Blanche Lincoln
wrote that:
Congress recognized that the capital and margin
requirements in this bill could have an impact on swaps
contracts currently in existence. For this reason, we
'provided legal certainty to those contracts currently in
'existence, providing that no contract could be terminated,
'renegotiated, modified, amended, or supplemented
based.., on the implementation of any requirement in the
Act .... 159
Given the significant amount of outstanding OTC derivatives, this
omission has the effect of, at least temporarily, severely circumscribing the
effect of the law. Though forcing capital or margin requirements on
existing swaps would impose an unforeseen burden on market participants,
failure to do so would be a mistake. If this exemption is permitted, it could
allow entities to continue to pose significant counterparty risk, which puts
its counterparties and the entire economy at risk.
C. Clearing Requirements
1. The Mechanics of Clearing Requirements
Clearing requirements for derivatives are an important tool in limiting
the counterparty risk that market participants are exposed to. The way in
which clearing works is relatively simple. After two counterparties have
decided to enter into a derivative, they will approach a clearing organization
that will buy the derivative from the seller and then immediately turn
around and sell an identical derivative to the buyer. 16  Because there are
two different derivatives, one between the buyer and the clearinghouse and
the other between the seller and the clearinghouse, the counterparty risk
between the buying and selling counterparty is eliminated and assumed by• - 161
the clearing organization. Although clearing organizations are not
subject to significant levels of market risk due to the fact they are entering• . 162
into offsetting positions, because the clearing organization takes the role
of both purchaser and seller, they are, however, exposed to significant
levels of counterparty risk.
The primary benefit of clearing is that the clearing organization, by
assuming the counterparty risk of the derivative, insulates non-defaulting
159 Letter from Dodd and Lincoln, supra note 153.
160 Chander & Costa, supra note 135, at 651.
161 Id.
161 Id. at 652.
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counterparties from the losses associated with a default.163 In the event of a
default, the clearing organization is also better able to absorb the losses by
distributing the loss among its members by drawing from the "default
mutualization fund" that all members are required to contribute to.164
2. Clearing Requirement Under Dodd-Frank
Like the capital and margin requirements, the clearing requirements are
split into both "swaps" and "security-based swaps." Dodd-Frank requires
derivative must be submitted to either a DCO if it qualifies as a "swap" or a
clearing agency if it is a "security-based swap" unless some exemption
applies.165 For a clearing organization to be willing and able to accept a
derivative for clearing, it must both meet the internal eligibility
requirements of the organization and also be deemed suitable for clearing
by the relevant Commission. 166 For the clearing organization to be willing
to clear a certain type of derivative, it must be standardized so as to
facilitate the efficient processing of trades and liquid in order to manage the
risk associated with it.167 To ensure that clearing organizations only clears
appropriate trades they must submit a request to and be granted permission
from the relevant Commission before it is able to clear a certain type of
derivative. 168
There is also an exemption for end-users. It exempts derivatives in
which one of the counterparties "(i) is not a financial entity; (ii) is using
swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk; and (iii) notifies the
Commission, in a manner set forth by the Commission, how it generally
meets its financial obligations associated with entering into non-cleared
swaps." 169 The party that qualifies for the end-user exemption may still
request that the swap be cleared, but this is left up to its discretion. 1
70
In order to ensure their safe and sound operation, clearing organizations
must be registered with either the SEC or the CFTC or fall into one of the
narrow exemptions from registration. 171 In order for a derivative clearing
organization to be in compliance-i.e., "to be registered and to maintain
163 Id.
'64 ld. at 653-54.165 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 723, 763, 124
Stat. 1675, 1762 (2010).
166 id.
167 Erika W. Nijenhuis et al., Credit Default Swaps in the New Regulatory
Environment, 906 PLI/TAx 59, 63 (2010).
168 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 723, 763.
169 Id.
170 Id.171 Id. §§ 725, 763.
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registration"-it must observe a number of rules and regulations imposed
on them both by the statutes and by the relevant Commission. 72 The
regulations of the clearing organizations that clear "swaps" and those that
clear "security-based swaps" are slightly different. DCOs must comply
with "core principles" set out in the statute and comply with CFTC
mandates, 173 while clearing agencies must comply with the rules set forth
by the SEC, which will "reflect evolving United States and international
standards."'
' 74
3. Optimal clearing requirements
The clearing requirement provision was one of the least contentious
provisions and many of the concerns that were initially raised have been
addressed. One concern addressed in the statute is the safe operation of
these organizations, as they are susceptible to failure just as any other
derivative counterparty.175  The best way to ensure that clearing
organizations operate safely is for the relevant agencies to ensure that they
comply with the "core principles" that DCOs, but not clearing agencies,
must already comply with.
The first principle is that the organization "shall have adequate
financial, operational, and managerial resources... to discharge" its
responsibilities.'76 While the bill does not specify what would constitute
adequate operational or managerial resources, it does establish a base level
of financial resources that must be present. The derivative clearing
organization must maintain a level of financial resources, including
adequate capital reserves, that would allow it to continue to meet its
obligations to its counterparties "notwithstanding a default by [the
counterparty] creating the largest financial exposure for that organization in
extreme but plausible market conditions" and also meet its operational
expenses for one year'77
Second, the clearing organization must set and maintain certain
eligibility requirements for those wishing to clear their derivatives and theproducts to be cleared. 17 The derivative clearing organization must set
admission standards for clients that take into account the "financial
resources and operational capacity to meet obligations from participation in
172 id.
.
73 Id. § 725.
174 Id. § 763.
175 See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Insight: The Clearing House Rules, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5,
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the derivatives clearing organization," which means the clearing
organization must be relatively confident the client will not default on its
obligations. 79
Third, the DCO is required to have adequate risk management tools in
place to manage the substantial amount of counterparty risk that it will
undertake.18 0  Dodd-Frank requires that these clearing organizations
constantly monitor their risk exposure for each client on a daily basis and
implement the required measures to ensure that even if some clients do
default "the operations of the [DCO] would not be disrupted; and non-
defaulting members or participants would not be exposed to losses that non-
defaulting members or participants cannot anticipate or control."181 To this
end, the bill mandates that the DCO set margin requirements 18 for their
customers that "shall be sufficient to cover potential exposures in normal
market conditions.
1 83
These three provisions together help ensure that the clearing
organization itself will not default on its obligations to counterparties by
ensuring it is has procedures in place to lessen the chance and effect of
client defaults and also have sufficient funds available to cover any possible
losses. Given the possibly catastrophic effect of the default of a clearing
organization, it is imperative that these three core principles be
implemented to the fullest possible extent.
D. Exchange Trading
1. The Mechanics of Exchange Requirements
Dodd-Frank proposes that a number of OTC derivatives be traded on
organized exchanges. The benefit of forcing cleared swaps onto exchanges
is that the exchanges will aid in the price discovery of these instruments by
providing "continuous data on prices of transactions" and also increase the
liquidity in the market. 84 The primary benefit from trading derivatives on
exchanges is that it will reduce the bid-ask spreads on many swaps.185 The
179 Id.
180 Id.
182 id.
182 It is almost certain the DCO will require both variation and initial margin, but
that was not explicitly addressed in the bill. See Chander & Costa, supra note 135,
at 653.
183 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 725.
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bid-ask spread represents what market makers will pay and the price at
which they are willing sell at a given point in time with the former almost
always lower than the latter. 186 Because "the spread between the ask and
the bid represents a transaction cost for the investors," by lowering this
spread, exchange trading will reduce the operating costs of those in the
derivatives market and promote their use by end users. 187 The increased
price transparency will also benefit market participants because timely and
accurate prices are important variables when setting margin requirements so
as to manage counterparty risk. 88 Liquidity will also benefit market
participants by allowing them to quickly close out a losing position in order
to mitigate losses.
189
2. Exchange Trading Requirements under Dodd-Frank
The bill requires that derivatives subject to the clearing requirement be
executed "on a board of trade designated as a contract market" or "on a
swap execution facility," but only if there is a "market" or "facility" willing
to accept it. 9 This requirement will not apply if one of the parties to the
transaction qualifies for the end-user exemption from clearing. 9' A swap
"board of trade" is simply a facility where multiple buyers and sellers come
together to execute and trade swaps, but to be designated as a "contract
market," the "board of trade" must comply with all the "core principles" set
out in the statute and regulations imposed by the Commissions. 92 A swap
execution facility ("SEF") is similar to a "board of trade" and is defined as
a "trading system or platform in which multiple participants have the ability
to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple
participants in the facility or system ... including any trading facility, that
(A) facilitates the execution of swaps between persons; and (B) is not a
designated contract market."'193 The SEFs must either be registered under
the act or fall under an exemption from registration.1 94 For the SEF to be
registered it must "comply with (A) the core principles described in this
186 The spread effectively represents the premium buyers and sellers are willing to
pay to either purchase or sell the swap immediately. If for example, a buyer needed
to buy a swap immediately he would have to pay the ask price but if he was not
time constrained or concerned that the price might rise further he could just offer
the lower bid price and hope someone lowers their asking price to meet it.
187 SEC, Division of Enforcement: Recent Cases and Issues, 978 PLI/CORP 7,185
(1997).188 Scott, supra note 184, at 703.
189 Id. at 704.
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subsection; and (B) any requirement that the Commission may impose by
rule or regulation pursuant to section 8a(5).' 95
The "core principles" that boards of trade must observe to be
designated as a contract market and those which SEFs need to comply with
in order to be registered are similar. Both have "reasonable discretion" in
implementing them subject to the rules and regulations of the relevant
Commissions.196 The core principles dictate that, like stock exchanges such
as the New York Stock Exchange, both shall establish and enforce rules for
its members, including membership eligibility guidelines, the terms and
conditions of the derivatives being traded, the process by which the swaps
will be traded, and abuse detection and prevention tools. 97 Both must also
collect and make public information surrounding the swaps that are being
traded on the facility. 98 Finally, they must ensure that they have adequate
financial, operational, and managerial resources to operate, and they must
ensure the "financial integrity of swaps," including ensuring compliance
with the clearing requirements.' 99
3. Optimal Exchange Trading Requirement
Much like the provision requiring clearing of certain swaps, the
exchange requirements have received little criticism. The only concern is
that if the SEFs and boards of trade are run by the large dealer banks, the
exchanges may purposefully restrict the amount of information they make
public in the hopes that the price opacity will allow the dealer banks to
charge a larger bid-ask spread. 200 Though the SEFs are required to "make
public timely information on price, trading volume, and other trading data
on swaps" and boards of trade are required to make similar information
public on a daily basis, if dealer banks obtain significant influence on
exchanges, they could pressure the exchanges to only minimally comply
with these mandates.20'
To address this concern, Dodd-Frank requires that the Commissions
adopt rules with the intended purpose of reducing any conflict of interest
between the exchanges and swap dealers and major swap participants.02
The statute specifically mentions that the commissions may mandate
"numerical limits on the control of, or the voting rights with respect to"
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197 Id.198 Id.
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either SEFs or boards of trade.2 °3 Given the benefits provided by having
transparent derivatives exchanges, the Commissions should avoid any
pressure to capitulate to large dealer banks.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the enacted of Dodd-Frank, the landscape of the OTC derivatives
market has been fundamentally altered. The much-needed regulatory
overhaul has left the economy and individual participants less susceptible to
the extreme market fluctuations seen in the recent financial crisis, but has
also imposed significant new burdens on both private entities. Though
Dodd-Frank remedies a number of regulatory oversights that likely
exacerbated the recent financial crisis, there are still numerous actions that
regulators may take that could increase the stability of the market and
decrease costs the regulation imposes. As many of the agency regulations
that will shape Dodd-Frank have not yet been implemented, the future
efficacy of Dodd-Frank is, in many ways, yet to be seen.
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